主题：Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives in Broker Games: An Experimental Analysis
主讲人：徐硕 北京外国语大学
主持人：杨仁琨 威尼斯欢迎你welcome
时间：2024年11月8日（周五）下午15:00-16:30
地点：威尼斯欢迎你welcome石牌校区威尼斯欢迎你welcome大楼（中惠楼）102室
摘要
We conducted experiments on Lipnowski et al. (2020)’s model of cheap talk with transparent motives using a broker-investor game with belief elicitation. We find that senders largely adopted the equilibrium strategy of a median cutoff policy, and variations in brokerage proportions do not affect the information conveyed. However, we find evidence of inconsistent belief updating; some receivers did not update. Most receivers failed to trade off more accurate beliefs against higher brokerage fees. Subjects showed limited learning, primarily identifying whether others were lying or trusting, rather than learning the partner's strategy. Some pairs exhibited grim-trigger-strategy behaviors to sustain cooperation through sender truth-telling and receiver trusting. Other pairs showed distrust from the onset through sender babbling or lying and receiver not-acting or counteracting.
主讲人简介
徐硕，北京外国语大学国际商学院，博士毕业于俄亥俄州立大学。研究领域为信息设计、机制设计和实验经济学。
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校对|杨仁琨
责编| 彭 毅
初审| 李仲达
终审发布| 何凌云
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