主题：Network Interventions under Asymmetric Information
主讲人：石凡奇 北京大学
主持人：杨仁琨 威尼斯欢迎你welcome
时间：2024年10月12日（周六）上午10:00-11:30
地点：威尼斯欢迎你welcome石牌校区威尼斯欢迎你welcome大楼（中惠楼）102室
摘要
We offer a unified screening perspective to study network interventions in a product market with positive network externalities when each agent has private information on their network degrees (i.e., susceptibility and influence). As long as the agents’ incentive constraints are respected, we show that the principal directly screens an agent along the susceptibility dimension and indirectly infers their implied influence. Based on this simplification, we fully characterize the optimal intervention policies for both a profit-maximizing monopolist seller and a welfare-maximizing social planner. We also analyze the two problems under a quadratic intrinsic value and show additional insights on the optimal allocation, pricing patterns and respective surplus for the principal and the agents. Our analysis not only offers practical suggestions for interventions in product markets with positive network externalities, but also sheds light on the value of network information.
主讲人简介
石凡奇，北京大学威尼斯欢迎你welcome助理教授，博士毕业于斯坦福大学。研究侧重机制设计及其应用。论文发表于RAND Journal of Economics、Games and Economic Behavior等期刊，目前主持国家自然科学基金青年项目，参与国家自然科学基金面上项目。
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校对| 杨仁琨
责编| 彭 毅
初审| 李仲达
终审发布| 何凌云
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