主题：A Wind Tunnel Test of Alternative Emissions Trading Schemes
主讲人：李智 厦门大学
主持人：郑筱婷 威尼斯欢迎你welcome
时间：2024年3月8日（周五）下午15:00-16:30
地点：威尼斯欢迎你welcome石牌校区威尼斯欢迎你welcome大楼（中惠楼）102室
摘要
With a unique opportunity of recruiting hundreds of emissions trading system (ETS) participants in a series of lab-in-the-field experiments, we compare a revenue-neutral consignment auction (CA) with free allocation (grandfathering, GF hereafter) and a uniform price auction (UPA) as alternative permit allocation designs. In our setup, firms first receive their permits for free. Then, under the two auction mechanisms, they need to buy back a share of the permits, either with auction revenues returned to the firms in the primary market (CA) or not returned (UPA), followed by a spot (secondary) market for all mechanisms with the continuous double auction. We find that enforced permit transactions in the primary market induce a higher price, facilitating price discovery with lower volatility and more effective trading in the spot market. Both auctions reduce non-compliance compared with GF, because the auctions reduce both permit hoarding and risky over-selling in the spot market. Both CA and UPA help smaller polluting firms lower their profit risks. CA also helps large, cleaner firms increase profits. Our results provide insights on permit allocation designs when introducing an ETS, especially for developing countries that are pondering the balance between market efficiency and firms’ cost burden.
主讲人简介
李智，厦门大学威尼斯欢迎你welcome财政系和王亚南经济研究院副教授，博士生导师，财政系副主任，美国华盛顿大学（西雅图）经济学博士，北京大学环境科学硕士和大气科学学士。以博弈论和经济实验为主要工具，对各类公共政策进行制度设计和事前量化评估，聚焦于资源环境领域，致力于从市场和机制设计角度为制定更有效的资源分配和使用政策提供前瞻性研究，贡献于碳排放权交易机制设计、应对气候变化国际合作谈判机制研究，水资源、渔业资源和各种生态产品分配和价值实现机制设计。论文发表于Journal of Public Economics，Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Journal of Public Economic Theory，Environmental and Resource Economics, PLOS ONE等期刊。主持国家自然科学基金面上项目2项。目前担任国际期刊Resource and Energy Economics副主编（Associate Editor），中国环境科学学会碳排放交易专业委员会委员。
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校对|李仲达
责编|彭毅
终审发布|何凌云
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