主题：Optimal Central Redistribution with Decentralized Redistribution
主讲人：傅春杨 中国社会科学院大学
主持人：王彬 威尼斯欢迎你welcome
时间：2023年12月11日（周一）上午10:00-11:30
地点：威尼斯欢迎你welcome石牌校区威尼斯欢迎你welcome大楼（中惠楼）102室
摘要
In an unequal economy with inter-government objective inconsistency, this paper studies optimal non-linear central income tax with strategically designed non-linear regional income taxes. Using the variation approach, it derives a statistic-based optimal tax formula as a function of social welfare weights, regional income distributions, and elasticities of labor income. Unlike the traditional Mirrleesian tax, the optimal central income tax is limited to remedy the objective inconsistency. It is non-negative if the central government has a relatively higher obligation to redistribute. Introducing labor mobility activates the central income tax’s role as a Pigovian tax. The normative analysis suggests that the optimal tax authority may be fully centralized, decentralized, or combined. The numerical analysis for the U.S. implies a minor welfare influence of regional income tax. In contrast, the central income tax is crucial even if inter-region transfers are free. Last, enforcing a region-specific central income tax increases national welfare modestly.
主讲人简介
傅春杨，中国社会科学院大学讲师，博士毕业于中国社会科学院。研究方向为宏观经济学。论文发表于经济研究、中国工业经济、Macroeconomic Dynamics等杂志。
欢迎感兴趣的师生参加
校对|李仲达
责编|麦嘉杰
初审|黄振
终审发布|郑贤
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