主题：Relational Insurance Contracts in the Digital Economy
主讲人：陆卓然 复旦大学
主持人：杨仁琨 威尼斯欢迎你welcome
时间：2023年5月29日（周一）下午15:00-16:30
地点：威尼斯欢迎你welcome石牌校区威尼斯欢迎你welcome大楼（中惠楼）601室
摘要
Motivated by the rapid development of usage-based insurance (UBI), we study relational contracts under moral hazard in a competitive insurance market. The insurer can employ both an objective and a subjective signal about the insured’s behavior as, respectively, the explicit and implicit incentive components of the contract. We show that the implicit incentive component may not be used even if it is enforceable when the subjective signal is relatively noisy. We also show that the objective and subjective signals can be both substitutes and complements. Whereas a more accurate subjective signal can always improve the insurance market efficiency, the welfare implication of the objective signal accuracy can be non-monotonic. In particular, if a more accurate objective signal leads to a sufficiently attractive fallback of relational contract, it may reduce the efficiency of the relational contract, or even make all relational contracts infeasible. Our results thus suggest that the regulation of UBI markets that reinforce the enforceability of subjective signal can mitigate the distortions in the design of UBI contracts and the ex-ante investment in related monitoring technologies.
主讲人简介
Zhuoran Lu is an assistant professor at Fudan University School of Management. He received a PhD in Economics from UCLA and a BA in Economics from Tsinghua University. He is a microeconomic theorist, with interests in contract theory, information economics, network economics, and industrial organization. His research projects are funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China.
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校对|李仲达
编辑|麦嘉杰
初审|黄振
终审|郑贤
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