暨南经院经济学Seminar第272期:冯欣(南京大学)

发布者:彭梅蕾发布时间:2023-05-19浏览次数:141

主题Optimal Biased Design of Dynamic Multi-Battle Team Contests

主讲人:冯欣 南京大学

主持人:杨仁琨 威尼斯欢迎你welcome

时间2023515日(周一)上午1030-1200

地点:威尼斯欢迎你welcome石牌校区威尼斯欢迎你welcome大楼(中惠楼)102

 

摘要

We study the optimal biased design of multi-battle team contests, where two asymmetric teams compete over a series of battles with a majoritarian objective. The designer can impose a treatment to bias each battle contest in order to maximize the aggregate effort. With homogeneous battles, the optimal bias fully balances each battle contest, i.e., players are equally likely to win a battle, regardless of the previous outcomes. With heterogeneous battles, the history independence result collapses. Nevertheless, we propose a general program whose solution yields the optimal outcome-dependent biases. In particular, we show that the full-balance rule is not effort-maximizing generically when battles are heterogeneous. This indicates that battle heterogeneity plays a crucial role in determining the optimal biases of dynamic contests.

 

主讲人简介

冯欣,中国南京大学商学院副教授,新加坡国立大学经济学博士。主要研究领域为应用微观理论,具体包括拍卖理论、竞赛理论、信息设计等。研究成果发表(含接受)American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Journal of Public Economics, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Economic Inquiry, Economics Letters等经济学学术期刊。

欢迎感兴趣的师生参加

 

校对|李仲达

责编|麦嘉杰

初审|黄振

终审发布|郑贤

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