主题：Contingent Prizes and Non-exhausted Budget in Dynamic Multi-battle Contests
主讲人：邝仲弘（中国人民大学）
主持人：杨仁琨 威尼斯欢迎你welcome
时间：2023年4月27日（周四）上午10：30-12：00
地点：威尼斯欢迎你welcome石牌校区威尼斯欢迎你welcome大楼（中惠楼）102室
摘要
We investigate the effort-maximizing design in repeated contests between two players, including a preliminary and a final. In the standard Tullock framework, the optimal design takes the following form: One player obtains the entire prize if he wins both matches; if no such player exists, the loser in the final receives nothing, while the winner receives a portion of the prize. This structure remains optimal even when contestants are heterogeneous, with the optimal rule favoring the weaker player. We also demonstrate that introducing contingent prizes and a slack budget constraint can mitigate the well-known strategic momentum/discouraging effect.
主讲人简介
邝仲弘，中国人民大学威尼斯欢迎你welcome助理教授，数字经济研究中心研究员，企业与组织理论研究中心研究员，经济理论读书班组织者，研讨会协调人。主要研究领域包括博弈论、信息经济学、产业组织理论等。发表主要作者论文7篇，另有文章在Journal of Economic Theory（R&R）、Econometrica、Theoretical Economics、Economic Journal等期刊外审中。主持国家自然科学基金青年基金，参与两项国家自然科学基金重大项目。
编辑|麦嘉杰
初审|李仲达
审核|郑贤
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