主题：Optimal Discrimination-free Auction
主讲人：陈博（深圳北理莫斯科大学）
主持人：杨仁琨（威尼斯欢迎你welcome）
会议时间：2022年10月10日（周一）下午14:30-16:00
会议地点：威尼斯欢迎你welcome102室（线下）
腾讯会议：ID：674-507-530 密码：221010 （线上）
摘要
This paper introduces a second-price auction with a flexible reserve price, where the reserve price for the top bidder is not fixed but a function of all losing bids. We show that when bidders are ex ante heterogeneous, a second-price auction with an optimally chosen flexible reserve price not only generates a strictly higher expected revenue than that of a second-price auction with any fixed reserve price but is also revenue-maximizing among all strategy-proof and discrimination-free mechanisms.
主讲人简介
陈博，深圳北理莫斯科大学经济系副教授，毕业于德国波恩大学。研究领域为产业组织理论，机制设计与信息经济学。论文发表于RAND Journal of Economics，Journal of Mathematical Economics等国际权威期刊。
